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Abstract—Net neutrality on the Internet is perceived as the
policy that mandates Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to treat
all data equally, regardless of the source, destination, or type of
transmitted data. In this work, we consider a scheme in which the
decision makers of the market are two ISPs, one “big” Content
Provider (CP), and a continuum of end-users. One of the ISPs
is neutral and the other is non-neutral, i.e. she offers a premium
quality to a CP in exchange for a side-payment. In addition, we
assume that the CP can differentiate between ISPs by controlling
the quality of the content she is offering on each one. In this part
of the paper, we consider a scenario in which end-users are not
locked in with the ISPs and can switch between ISPs easily. We
formulate a sequential game, and show that there exists a unique
Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) for the game, where
the CP pays the side-payment to the non-neutral ISP and offers
her content with the premium quality. In addition, the CP does
not offer her content on the neutral ISP. Thus, driving this ISP
out of the market.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Net-neutrality on the Internet is the set of policies that
prevents a paid or unpaid discrimination by ISPs among
different types of transmitted data [3]. Since January 2014,
when a federal appeals court struck down parts of the Federal
Communication Commission’s (FCC) rules for net-neutrality
[4], the net-neutrality debate has received more attention. In
February 2015, the FCC reclassified the Internet as a utility
[5], providing the grounds for this agency to secure even
stricter net-neutrality rules. However, this will not be the end
of the net-neutrality debates. Further actions, from ISPs and
Content Providers (CPs), are expected, since both may have
incentives to adopt a non-neutral regime. For example, some
CPs are willing to pay for a premium quality by which they
can increase the usage, the satisfaction, or the number of their
subscribers [6]. On the other hand, ISPs can increase their
profit by charging CPs for a premium quality. In addition, the
net-neutrality issue is not restricted to the U.S. For example,
in October 2015, the European parliament has rejected legal
amendments for strict net-neutrality rules, and passed a set of
rules that allow for sponsored data plans and Internet fast lanes
for “specialized services” [7].
Parts of this work were presented in CISS’16 [1]. Some of the preliminary
results and ideas of this work were presented as a poster in NetEcon’14 [2].
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Net-neutrality rules are often considered to be vague. For
example, in February 2014, Comcast and Netflix negotiated
a contract in which Netflix would pay Comcast for a faster
access to Comcast’s subscribers [8]. Both parties announced
that the contract is a peering agreement, and its goal is to
resolve the traffic imbalance. However, data shows that after
deploying the agreement, the average Netflix download speed
improved significantly [9]. Note that a contract for resolving
aggregate traffic imbalance at tier-1 ties (particularly between
an “eyeball” ISP and one serving a CP) in which the party
receiving the net traffic imbalance get paid is considered
“neutral” [10], [11]. Thus, although the Netflix-Comcast deal
does not violate the net-neutrality rules, it has a non-neutral
outcome of a side-payment between a residential ISP and a
CP. This reveals a net-neutrality loophole at tier-1 ties Service
Level Agreements (SLAs).
B. Related Works
This work falls in the category of economic models for a
non-neutral Internet [12]. This line of work can be divided
into two broad categories: those that consider a non-neutral
regime in which (a) a non-neutral ISP blocks the content
of the CPs that do not pay the side-payment [13], [14],
and those that consider (b) a non-neutral ISP that provides
quality differentiations for CPs and do not necessarily block a
content [15]–[24]. Note that in reality and because of FCC
restrictions on blocking the content, we expect the latter
scenario (differentiation in quality) to emerge. Thus, in this
work, we consider the second scenario.
These works can also be further divided into two other
categories: (i) those that consider monopolistic ISPs [16]–[21],
[25], and (ii) those that consider competition between ISPs
[13]–[15], [22]–[24]. Our work belongs to the latter case.
Note that in reality, at initial stages of migration to a non-
neutral regime, some ISPs would adopt a non-neutral regime
before others. Thus, we need to consider a model in which
some of the ISPs are neutral and some are non-neutral. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is one of the few works that
considers the problem of migration to a non-neutral regime.
The focus of previous works is on the social welfare analysis
of the market when all ISPs are neutral and/or all are non-
neutral, without considering the incentives of individual ISPs to
adopt a non-neutral regime. The excpetion is [15] in which the
authors consider competition between a neutral (public option)
ISP with non-neutral ISPs. They argue that the existence of a
neutral ISP increases the customer surplus in comparison to
a neutral scenario in which all ISPs are neutral. Contrary to
their results, we show (in Part II of the paper [26]) that the
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2competition between the neutral and non-neutral ISPs would
not always increase the customers welfare. The reason for the
differences between these results lies in the differences in the
models of the two paper. We show that different market powers
of ISPs, and the sensitivity of EUs and CPs to the quality of
the content are important factors in determining the welfare of
EUs. These factors are absent in the model of [15].
In addition, in contrast to the previous works, we consider
competition between ISPs that have different market powers1,
i.e. an asymmetric competition. Moreover, in most of the
previous works, CPs have a passive role, i.e. they are only
price-takers. However, in our model, we consider the quality
of the content that a CP offers for EUs of each ISP as the
strategy by which she can influence the equilibrium of the
market. For example, a CP can select a particular ISP and
offer with a high quality on this ISP, and stop offering her
content on other ISPs. By doing so, the CP might be able to
migrate EUs of other ISPs to the selected ISP.
C. Contributions
We model the interaction between ISPs and CPs in a non-
neutral regime in the presence of asymmetric competition
between ISPs when some of the ISPs are non-neutral and some
are neutral. In addition, we consider CPs that can differentiate
between ISPs by controlling the quality of the content they are
offering on each one. We consider a diverse set of parameters
for the market, e.g. market powers of ISPs, sensitivity of
EUs and the CP to the quality of the content. The goal is to
provide intuitions with respect to different parameters for the
new equilibrium of the market when the current equilibrium
(neutral regime) is disrupted and some ISPs have switched to
a non-neutral regime. Intuitions from our model and analysis
can be used by the regulator in designing efficient rules for
the Internet market.
D. Model and Formulation
We consider the market with two ISPs, one neutral and one
non-neutral. This can represent two groups of ISPs, neutral
and non-neutral, that are competing against each other. We
also consider a “big” CP with high market power that chooses
her strategies to influence the equilibrium outcome of the
market. All other CPs are considered to be passive in the
equilibrium selection process, and their effects are modeled
using a common factor in the utility of EUs. In addition, we
consider a continuum of End-Users (EUs) that decide on the
ISP they want to buy Internet subscription from. We assume
that EUs have different levels of innate preferences for each
ISP which can be because of initial set-up costs of a new
service upon switching the ISP or the reluctancy of EUs to
change the existing ISP. These innate preferences capture the
degree by which EUs are locked in with a particular ISP.
1Market power is the ability of a decision maker to raise the market price
for a good or service. In our model, we assume that the market power of an
ISP is dependent on the innate preferences of EUs for this ISP. This innate
preference can be the result of contracts between ISPs and EUs, the technical
barriers to switch between ISPs, or simply the inertia of EUs to change their
ISPs.
Market powers of ISPs are defined as a function of these innate
preferences.
In our model, both ISPs offer a free service for CPs up to
a threshold on quality. In addition, the non-neutral ISP offers
a premium quality in exchange of a side payment from the
CP. This side-payment can be negative or positive, where a
negative side-payment means a net payment from the non-
neutral ISP to the CP. For instance, a negative side payment
can arise in a scenario that the non-neutral ISP wants to make
sure that the monopolistic CP offers with a premium quality
and exclusively for her EUs. We assume that the CP generates
revenue through advertisements, and the advertisement profit
of the CP is an increasing function of the quality she offers to
EUs.
We formulate a sequential game and seek the Sub-game
Perfect Nash Eequilibrium (SPNE) of the sequential game
using backward induction.
One can expect different equilibrium outcomes in which
either (i) the CP offers her content only with a free (best effort)
quality, or (ii) the CP offers her content with free quality on
the neutral and with premium quality on the non-neutral ISP,
or (iii) the CP offers with a premium quality only on the non-
neutral ISP. Moreover, different equilibrium Internet access
fees and side payments can be selected by the ISPs whose
value directly affect the welfare of EUs. For example, the non-
neutral ISP can select a small Internet access fee to increase the
number of her EUs and generates most of her revenue through
the side-payment she charges the CP. In this case, because
of competition, the neutral ISP should decrease her Internet
access fee. Thus, the welfare of EUs would be high. Or, the
non-neutral ISP may select a small side-payment (possibly
negative) to make sure that the CP offers with a premium
quality, and generate her revenue by increasing Internet access
fees for EUs, which enables the neutral ISP to increase her
price for EUs. Thus, this scenario yields a small welfare for
EUs. Note that equilibrium outcomes determine the division of
EUs between ISPs, and some divisions maybe more desirable
for the CP. Thus, the CP can have an active role in choosing
the desirable equilibrium outcome (as well as the division of
EUs with ISPs) by controlling the quality of her content on
each ISP appropriately.
In this part of the paper, we focus on a scenario in
which these preferences are “relatively” small (smaller than
a threshold) and do not over rule major discrepancies on price
and quality. In the next part of the paper, we analyze the
complement of this scenario, i.e. when the preferences are
larger than a threshold.
E. Results
We show that when EUs have sufficiently low inertia for
ISPs, the game has a unique SPNE in which the CP offers her
content with premium quality on the non-neutral ISP while
she does not offer her content on the neutral ISP, to attract
all EUs to the non-neutral ISP on which users can receive a
better quality. Thus, the neutral ISP would be driven out of
the market. This implies that upon switching to a non-neutral
regime by an ISP, the neutral ISPs are forced to either leave
the market or adopt a non-neutral regime.
3In addition, we show that when inertias are in a middle
range, then under certain conditions (which we characterize),
again there exists a unique SPNE in which the CP offers her
content with premium quality on the non-neutral while she
does not offer her content on the neutral ISP. Regardless of
this, in this case, the neutral ISP can fetch a positive mass of
users. Thus, both ISPs are active. Simulation results over large
sets of parameters reveal that when inertias are in the middle
range the mentioned conditions are satisfied (presented in Part
II of the paper).
In Part II of the paper, we prove that for larger transport
costs, there exists SPNE outcomes in which the CP offers with
maximum possible quality on both ISPs and both ISPs are
active.
F. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, in
Section II, we present the model. Then, we find the SPNE(s)
when the inertias are small in Section III. In Section IV, we
summarize the equilibrium outcome, and discuss about the
results.
II. MODEL AND FORMULATIONS
We consider two ISPs, a CP, and a continuum of EUs.
ISPs:
We consider one of the ISPs to be neutral (ISP N) and the
other to be non-neutral (ISP NoN), i.e. the latter can offer a
premium quality for CPs in exchange of a side-payment. The
strategies of the neutral and non-neutral ISPs are to determine
Internet access fees for EUs, i.e. pN and pNoN , respectively.
We show that most of the results will depend on the difference
in the Internet access fees, i.e. ∆p := pNoN − pN .
In addition, the non-neutral ISP determines p˜, i.e. the side-
payment per quality. Note that p˜ can be positive or negative,
in which a negative side-payment implies a reverse flow of
money from the non-neutral ISP to the CP. The CP will pay
premium quality fee, i.e. the side-payment, to the non-neutral
ISP if she chooses to offer a quality higher than the free quality
threshold (q˜f ), and can offer with up to the quality q˜f for free
on both ISPs. The side-payment paid to the non-neutral ISP is
considered to be a linear function of the quality. Thus,
Side Payment =
{
p˜q if q > q˜f
0 Otherwise
We assume that the neutral ISP generates her profit from
EUs, and the non-neutral generates her profit from EUs and
potentially from the CP (if p˜ > 0 and the CP is willing to
pay for a premium quality). The payoff of the neutral and
non-neutral ISPs are as follows:
piN (pN ) = (pN − c)nN
piNoN (p˜, pNoN ) = (pNoN − c)nNoN + zp˜qNoN (1)
where nN and nNoN are the fraction of EUs that have access
to Internet via the neutral and non-neutral ISPs, respectively. In
addition, qNoN is the quality of the content on the non-neutral
ISP. The parameter z indicates whether the CP chooses to
offer her content with premium quality (z=1 when CP offers
with premium quality, and z = 0 otherwise). Recall that in
our model, being neutral or non-neutral is fixed and is not
a decision variable for ISPs. This means that the non-neutral
ISP has already have the infrastructure for offering a premium
quality to the CP. For this reason the fixed cost of investment
on the infrastructure for offering a non-neutral service is not
considered in the utility of ISP NoN.2
Note that from (1), for a positive payoff, pN ≥ c,3 and
pNoN ≥ c, if z = 0. However, if z = 1, there may exist cases
that even with pNoN < c, the payoff of ISP NoN would be
positive.
The CP:
The CP can potentially offer different quality levels on
different ISPs. The strategy of the CP is to choose a quality
of qN ∈ {0, q˜f} on the neutral ISP, and a quality of qNoN ∈
{0, q˜f , q˜p} on the non-neutral ISP, with ∆q := qNoN − qN . In
our model, the CP generates revenue through advertisement.
We also assume that the advertising profit that the CP receives
is a function of the number of EUs and the content quality
she delivers to these EUs4. Thus, the advertising profit is
proportional to qN and qNoN (As seen in the first two terms
of (2)).
In addition, the CP pays (or receive if p˜ < 0) a side-payment
to the non-neutral ISP based on the side-payment per quality
fee determined by the non-neutral ISP and the quality. Thus,
the profit of the CP is,
piCP (qN , qNoN , z) = nNκadqN + nNoNκadqNoN − zp˜qNoN (2)
where κad is a constant5, z = 0 if qNoN = {0, q˜f} (using free
quality) and z = 1 if qNoN = q˜p (using premium quality).
It may appear from (2) that the CP would lose nothing
by choosing at least a free quality on both ISPs. However,
this is not the case. As we explain later, nN and nNoN are
dependent on qN and qNoN , and there is a negative correlation
between them. In other words, increasing one of them (e.g.
nN ), decreases the other one (e.g. nNoN ). Therefore, the CP
may stop offering her content on the neutral ISP to increase
the number of EUs on the non-neutral ISP on which they can
2 Even when considering this fixed cost, analysis in this part and Part II
of the paper yields that the results of the paper would be the same as before.
Even if we consider both the investment cost and the decision of ISP NoN on
being neutral or non-neutral, then the fixed cost of investment would affect
the comparison between the payoff of ISP NoN in neutral and non-neutral
scenarios only by a constant (refer to the numerical results section of Part
II). These changes increase the regions of parameters in which an ISP would
lose payoff by switching to a non-neutral regime. The overall intuitions of the
paper are expected to be the same as before.
3Note that if pN < c, then the payoff is less than or equal to zero. On
the other hand, if pN ≥ c, the payoff is greater than or equal to zero. Thus,
without loss of generality, we consider pN ≥ c.
4Note that we are assuming that advertisements are quality-dependent. For
example they are video or sound. Some examples of the CPs that provide
these types of ads are YouTube and Spotify.
5We assume a linear dependency between the quality and the advertising
revenue and the cost. Thus, κad can be considered to be κad = κad,rev −
κad,cost.
4receive a better quality. This may lead to higher advertisement
revenues. Thus, the CP can control the number of subscribers
with each ISP by controlling the quality of the content on each
ISP appropriately.
End-Users:
The strategy of an EU is to choose one of the ISPs to buy
Internet access from. We assume that the neutral ISP is located
at 0, the non-neutral one is located at 1, and EUs are distributed
uniformly along the unit interval [0, 1]. The closer an EU to
an ISP, the more this EU prefers this ISP to the other. Note
that the notion of closeness and distance is used to model the
preference of EUs and market power of ISPs, and may not be
the same as the physical distance.
More formally, the EU located at x ∈ [0, 1] incurs a
transport cost of tNx (respectively, tNoN (1−x)) when joining
the neutral ISP (respectively, non-neutral ISP), where tN (re-
spectively, tNoN ) is the marginal transport cost for the neutral
(respectively, non-neutral) ISP. Two possible interpretations of
the transport costs are reluctancy of EUs to change their ISP
and initial set-up costs of a new service upon switching the ISP.
In sum, we consider tN and tNoN as the reluctancy of EUs for
connecting to the neutral and non-neutral ISPs, respectively.
We consider a common valuation for connecting to the
Internet for EUs regardless of the content of the CP. This
common valuation also models the valuation of EUs for CPs
other than the CP considered in this paper, i.e. the valuation
for connecting to the Internet regardless of the status of the
CP considered. Let v∗ denote this common valuation. The
overall valuation of an EU located at x ∈ [0, 1] for connecting
to the Internet via the neutral ISP (respectively, non-neutral
ISP) is considered to be v∗ + κuqN − tNx (respectively,
v∗+κuqNoN − tNoN (1−x)). Thus, the utility of an EU who
connects to the ISP j ∈ {N,NoN} located at distance xj of
the ISP, and is receiving the content with quality qj , is:
uEU,j(xj) = v
∗ + κuqj − tjxj − pj , j ∈ {N,NoN} (3)
This model is generally known as the hotelling model. A
symmetric version (tN = tNoN ) of this model is used in the
context of the Internet market in [24].
Note that the lower tN and tNoN , the easier EUs can switch
between ISPs, and thus the lower would be the inertia of EUs.
Therefore, high transport cost for an ISP is associated with EUs
that are locked in with the other ISP.
We consider the ratio of tN and tNoN as the relative bias of
EUs for ISPs. More specifically, the higher tNtN+tNoN (respec-
tively, tNoNtN+tNoN ), the higher the bias of EUs for connecting
to the Internet via ISP NoN (respectively, ISP N). We define
the market power of an ISP to be the relative biases, i.e. the
market power of the neutral and non-neutral ISPs are tNoNtN+tNoN
and tNtN+tNoN , respectively.
A schematic of the market is presented in Figure 1.
Formulations:
We assume that ISPs are the leaders of the game, and the
CP and EUs are followers. Thus, the sequence of the game is
as follows:
Fig. 1. A schematic of the market - red (solid) lines are the flow of
the money and blue (dashed) lines are the flow of the content.
1) The neutral and non-neutral ISPs determine Internet
access fees for EUs (pN and pNoN ).
2) The non-neutral ISP announces the premium quality fee
side-payment (p˜).
3) The CP decides on the quality of the content (qN and
qNoN ) for EUs of each ISP.
4) EUs decide which ISP to join.
We assumed that the selection of Internet access fees to happen
before the selection of the side-payment because of the rate of
change in these selections. Note that the Internet access fees
are expected to be kept constant for a longer time horizons
in comparison to the side-payment that is expected to change
more frequently depending on the demand and the network
specifications.
In the sequential game framework, we seek a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) using backward induction.
Definition 1. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE):
A strategy is an SPNE if and only if it constitutes a Nash
Equilibrium (NE) of every subgame of the game.
Definition 2. Backward Induction: Characterizing the equilib-
rium strategies starting from the last stage of the game and
proceeding backward.
Key Assumptions:
We assume that each EU chooses exactly one ISP to buy
Internet access. This is known as the full market coverage of
EUs by ISPs. This assumption is common in hotelling models
and is necessary to ensure competition between ISPs. An
equivalent assumption is to consider the common valuation v∗
to be sufficiently large so that the utility of EUs for connecting
to the Internet is positive regardless of the choice of ISP.
In this part of the paper, we consider the innate preferences
(transport costs) to be small. This case models the scenario in
which innate preferences do not over rule major discrepancies
on price and quality, and EUs can switch between ISPs easily.
More specifically, for our mathematical results, we use tN +
tNoN ≤ κuq˜p. Later in Part II of the paper, we consider the
complement of this assumption.
Disclaimer: We only use this assumption in characterizing
the strategies of ISPs in Stage 1 of the game in which they
determine their access fees for EUs. Thus, the results of other
stages of the game can be used in the general case presented
in Part II of the paper.
5III. THE SUB-GAME PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we seek a sub-game perfect equilibrium
using backward induction. In Sections III-A to III-D, we
characterize the equilibrium strategies of each stage in a
reverse order starting from Stage 4. For each stage, we assume
that each decision maker is aware of the strategies chosen by
other decision makers in previous stages.
A. Stage 4: Customers decide which ISP to join
In this subsection, we characterize the division of EUs
between ISPs in the equilibrium, i.e. nN and nNoN , using the
knowledge of the strategies chosen by the ISPs and the CP in
Stages 1, 2 and 3. To do so, we characterize the location of the
EU that is indifferent between joining either of the ISPs, xn.
Thus, EUs located at [0, xn) join the neutral ISP, and those
located at (xn, 1] joins the non-neutral ISP.
The EU located at xn ∈ [0, 1] is indifferent between
connecting to the neutral and non-neutral ISP6 if:
v∗ + κuqNoN − tNoN (1− xn)− pNoN = v∗ + κuqN − tNxn − pN
⇒ xn = tNoN + κu(qN − qNoN ) + pNoN − pN
tNoN + tN
(4)
Thus, the fraction of EUs with each ISP (nN and nNoN ) is:
nN =

0 if xn < 0
tNoN+κu(qN−qNoN )+pNoN−pN
tNoN+tN
if 0 ≤ xn ≤ 1
1 if xn > 1
nNoN = 1− nN
(5)
Note that they are a function of the vector of qualities ~q =
(qN , qNoN ) and the vector of access fees ~p = (pN , pNoN ),
which are known to the EUs in Stage 4.
B. Stage 3: The CP decides the qualities to offer over each
ISP (qN and qNoN )
In this section, we characterize qN , qNoN in the equi-
librium using the knowledge of the vector of access fees
~p = (pN , pNoN ) and p˜ from stages 1 and 2. Recall that z = 1
if qNoN > q˜f , and z = 0 otherwise.
First, we find the strategies that maximize
piCP (qN , qNoN , z) (2). Then, using appropriate tie-breaking
assumptions, we characterize the equilibrium strategies in
Theorems 1 and 2.
Note that the CP maximizes (2) by choosing the optimum
strategies, (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ), from the sets F0 or F1:
F0 = {(0, 0), (0, q˜f ), (q˜f , 0), (q˜f , q˜f )}
F1 = {(0, q˜p), (q˜f , q˜p)} (6)
Note that F0 and F1 are the set of strategies by which z = 0
and z = 1, respectively. Each of the sets F0 and F1 is further
divided into three subsets, FLi , F
I
i , and F
U
i , for i ∈ {0, 1},
depending on whether xN ≤ 0, 0 < xN < 1, or xN ≥ 1
6Recall that we assumed full market coverage by ISPs
(using (4)). Since xN is a function of qN and qNoN , these
conditions on xN lead to constraints on qN and qNoN . In
Table I, we present the division of the feasible set into the
above-mentioned subsets and the constraints on qN and qNoN
for each subset. Note that FL0 ∪ FL1 = FL, F I0 ∪ F I1 = F I ,
and FU0 ∪ FU1 = FU .
Next, we present the tie-breaking assumptions used to prove
these results (Section III-B1). Then, we present the statement
of the main results in Section III-B2. We prove the results in
Appendix A.
1) Tie- Breaking Assumptions: We assume that for choosing
the equilibrium strategy, the CP uses the following tie-breaking
assumptions that one can expect to arise in practice.
First note that (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FL (respectively,
(q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FU ) yields that n∗N = 0 (respectively,
n∗NoN = 0). Thus, in this case, the quality that the CP offers
on the neutral ISP (respectively, non-neutral ISP) is of no
importance. Therefore:
Assumption 1. If (q∗N , q∗NoN ) ∈ FL (respectively,
(q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FU ), then without loss of generality, q∗N = 0
(respectively, q∗NoN = 0).
In addition, in practice, it is natural to expect that the CP
prefer higher qualities to lower ones, e.g. z = 1 over z = 0,
if this selection does not affect the payoff.
Assumption 2. If the optimum solutions exist in F0 and F1,
then the CP chooses the ones in F1. In other words, if z = 1
and z = 0 yield equal maximum payoffs for the CP, then the
CP will pick z = 1, i.e. will use the premium quality.
The following tie-breaking assumptions are based on the
natural assumption that the CP would prefer to diversify her
content over different ISPs as long as this preference does not
lead to any loss in the payoff.
Assumption 3. If there exists global optimum solutions in
F I , then they are preferred by the CP over global optimum
solutions in FL and FU . In other words, if the outcome in
which only one ISP is operating and the outcome by which
both ISPs are operating yield the global maximum payoff for
the CP, then the CP chooses the strategies by which the latter
outcome occurs.
Assumption 4. Consider two strategies: (i) (q′N , q′NoN ) such
that at least one of q′N or q
′
NoN is zero, and (ii) (q
′′
N , q
′′
NoN )
such that q′′N > 0 and q
′′
NoN > 0. If these two strategies yield
the same payoff for the CP, then the CP chooses (ii), i.e. the
one with positive quality on both ISPs.
In the following tie-breaking assumption, we assume that
the CP takes into the account the social welfare of EUs for
tie-breaking between strategies.
Assumption 5. If the payoff of the CP when only the neutral
ISP is operating is equal to the payoff when only the non-
neutral is operating, then the CP prefers the strategy by which
the ISP that offers the lower Internet access fee, i.e. pi, i ∈
{N,NoN}, is operating. In other words, the CP chooses the
strategy that yields a higher social welfare for EUs.
6Conditions
xN ≤ 0 0 < xN < 1 xN ≥ 1(
qNoN − qN ≥ ∆p+tNoNκu
) (
∆p−tN
κu
< qNoN − qN < ∆p+tNoNκu
) (
qNoN − qN ≤ ∆p−tNκu
)
All EUs join Non-neutral EUs divide between both ISPs All EUs join Neutral Union (
⋃
)
z = 0 FL0 F
I
0 F
U
0 F0
z = 1 FL1 F
I
1 F
U
1 F1
Union (
⋃
) FL F I FU F
TABLE I. NOTATIONS FOR DIFFERENT SUBSETS OF THE FEASIBLE SET. EXPRESSIONS IN PARENTHESIS ARE EQUIVALENT FORM OF THE CONDITIONS,
E.G. xN ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ qNoN − qN ≥ ∆p+tNoNκu .
Note that the above-mentioned assumptions over-ride each
other in the order specified. For example, if two strategies one
in FL1 and the other in F
I
0 are both global maximum, then
Assumption 2 suggests that the CP chooses the strategy in FL1 ,
and Assumption 3 suggests that the CP chooses the strategy
in F I0 . Since Assumption 2 comes before Assumption 3, the
CP chooses the strategy in FL0 .
Next, using these tie-breaking assumptions, we characterize
the equilibrium strategies chosen by the CP.
2) Main Results: First, we define certain thresholds that
appear in the results:
Definition 3. • p˜t,1 = κad(1− q˜fq˜p )
• p˜t,2 = κad(nNoN − q˜fq˜p ) , where nNoN =
tN+κuq˜p−∆p
tN+tNoN
.
• p˜t,3 = κadnNoN (1 − q˜fq˜p ), where nNoN =
tN+κu(q˜p−q˜f )−∆p
tN+tNoN
.
• ∆pt = κu(2q˜p − q˜f )− tNoN
We would observe that, when characterizing the optimum
strategies, p˜t,1, p˜t,2, and p˜t,3 would be thresholds on side-
payment, and ∆pt would be a threshold on the difference in
the access fees. Also, recall that ∆p = pNoN − pN .
In Theorem 1, we characterize the equilibrium strategies
of the CP by which zeq = 0 for different values of ∆p.
Then, using these results, in Theorem 2, we characterize the
equilibrium strategies of the CP in general case for different
regions of ∆p.
Theorem 1. If (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F0, then:
1. if −tNoN < ∆p < tN , then (qeqN , qeqNoN ) = (q˜f , q˜f ) ∈ F I0 .
2. if ∆p ≥ tN , (qeqN , qeqNoN ) = (q˜f , 0) ∈ FU0 .
3. if ∆p ≤ −tNoN , (qeqN , qeqNoN ) = (0, q˜f ) ∈ FL0 .
In addition, the utility of the CP by each candidate equilibrium
strategy is κadq˜f .
Theorem 1 is proved in Appendix A.
For proving this theorem, we characterize optimums strate-
gies among all (qN , qNoN ) ∈ F0. Note that if (qeqN , qeqNoN ) ∈
F0, then it must be one of the optimum strategies character-
ized. Thus, using these optimum strategies and tie-breaking
assumptions, we characterize (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ). Later, we will see
that this theorem also characterizes the optimum strategies of
the CP in the benchmark case in which both ISPs are forced
to be neutral.
Intuitively, as ∆p increases, the number of EUs with ISP
NoN decreases. Thus, as the results of Theorem 1 confirms,
as ∆p increases, the outcome of the market moves from FL0 ,
i.e. all EUs join the non-neutral ISP, to F I0 , i.e. both ISPs have
positive share of EUs, and to FU0 , i.e. all EUs join the neutral
ISP.
In Theorem 2, we characterize the equilibrium strategy of
the CP in general case. We prove that the results are threshold-
type: when the side-payment, i.e. p˜, is less than a threshold
the CP chooses the premium quality, i.e. zeq = 1, and when
p˜ is higher than the threshold, zeq = 0 and the CP chooses
the strategies according to Theorem 1. We also characterize
the value of this thresholds for different regions of ∆p. Note
that, as explained, as ∆p increases, the number of EUs with
ISP NoN decreases. This affects the payoff of the CP, and
subsequently the value of the side-payment that ISP NoN
charges to the CP. Thus, the value of the threshold on the
side-payment depends on ∆p.
Theorem 2. Let the thresholds ∆pt, p˜t,1, p˜t,2, and p˜t,3 as
characterized in Definition 3, then:
1) If ∆p ≤ κuq˜p − tNoN :
• if p˜ ≤ p˜t,1, then zeq = 1, and (qeqN , qeqNoN ) =
(0, q˜p) ∈ FL1 .• if p˜ > p˜t,1, then zeq = 0, and qeqN and qeqNoN are
determined by Theorem 1.
2) If κuq˜p−tNoN < ∆p < tN+κuq˜p, and q˜f ≤ tN+tNoNκu :
a) if κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆p < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ), and:
i) if ∆p ≥ ∆pt:
• if p˜ ≤ p˜t,3, then zeq = 1 and
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 .• if p˜ > p˜t,3, then zeq = 0, and qeqN and
qeqNoN are determined by Theorem 1.
ii) if ∆p < ∆pt:
• if p˜ ≤ p˜t,2, then zeq = 1 and
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 .• if p˜ > p˜t,2, then zeq = 0, and qeqN and
qeqNoN are determined by Theorem 1.
b) if tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) ≤ ∆p < tN + κuq˜p:
i) if p˜ ≤ p˜t,2, then zeq = 1, and (qeqN , qeqNoN ) =
(0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 .
ii) if p˜ > p˜t,2, then zeq = 0, and q
eq
N and q
eq
NoN
are determined by Theorem 1.
3) If κuq˜p−tNoN < ∆p < tN+κuq˜p, and q˜f > tN+tNoNκu :
a) if p˜ ≤ p˜t,2, then zeq = 1, and (qeqN , qeqNoN ) =
(0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 .
b) if p˜ > p˜t,2, then zeq = 0, and q
eq
N and q
eq
NoN are
determined by Theorem 1.
4) If ∆p ≥ tN + κuq˜p, then zeq = 0, and qeqN and qeqNoN
are determined by Theorem 1.
7Theorem 2 is proved in Appendix A.
Note that the thresholds p˜t,1, p˜t,2, and p˜t,3 are decreasing
with respect to q˜fq˜p . Thus, as theorem implies, the higher
q˜p
q˜f
, the
higher would be the threshold on p˜ after which the CP chooses
the free quality over the premium one. In addition, with high
q˜p and low tNoN , the CP prefers to choose the strategy by
which the neutral ISP is driven out of the market.
In the next section, we characterize the optimum side-
payment fee for the non-neutral ISP.
C. Stage 2: ISP NoN determines the side-payment, p˜:
In this stage, ISP NoN chooses the equilibrium strategy p˜ =
p˜eq , with the knowledge of pNoN and pN , to maximize the
following payoff:
piNoN (pNoN , p˜) = (pNoN − c)nNoN + zp˜qNoN (7)
First, we introduce a tie-breaking assumption (Assump-
tion 6) for ISP NoN. In Theorem 3, we characterize the
necessary and sufficient condition on p˜eq by which zeq = 1,
i.e. the CP chooses the premium quality. Subsequently, in
Theorem 4, we characterize p˜eq by which zeq = 1.7 The proofs
of theorems are presented in Appendix B.
The following tie-breaking assumption for ISP NoN is
used to determine the optimum strategy in this stage. In
this tie-breaking assumption, we assume that because of legal
complexities8 of a non-neutral regime, whenever ISP NoN is
indifferent between zeq = 0 and zeq = 1, she chooses p˜ such
that zeq = 0, i.e. choosing neutrality over non-neutrality.
Assumption 6. If p˜1 is such that (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F1, i.e. zeq =
1, and p˜2 is such that (q
eq
N , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F0 yield the same payoff
for ISP NoN, this ISP chooses p˜2, i.e. the one that yields zeq =
0.
Recall that in Definition 3, we characterized some threshold
values for the side payment. For each value of ∆p, the actual
threshold on the side payment is equal to one the thresholds
characterized. Next, we define and characterize the actual
threshold, i.e. p˜t, based on the results in Theorem 2:
Definition 4. We define p˜t = p˜t,1 if conditions of item 1 of
Theorem 2 is met, p˜t = p˜t,2 if the conditions of items 2-a-ii,
2-b, and 3 of Theorem 2 is met, and p˜t = p˜t,3 if the conditions
of the item 2-a-i of Theorem 2 is met. Note that p˜t,1, p˜t,2, and
p˜t,3 are characterized in Definition 3, respectively.
The following Theorem characterizes a necessary and suf-
ficient condition on p˜t by which zeq = 1.
Theorem 3. zeq = 1 if and only if piNoN (pNoN , p˜t) >
piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜) and ∆p < tN + κuq˜p, where
piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜) is the payoff of ISP NoN when zeq = 0.
7Note that if zeq = 0, (7) would be independent of p˜. Thus, we only need
to characterize p˜eq by which zeq = 1. In addition, zeq is determined by the
CP in Stage 3 with the knowledge of p˜, pN , and pNoN .
8Although the new rules are not final yet, it is expected that non-neutrality
would be accepted by the FCC only under extensive traffic monitoring by the
FCC. This introduces an implicit cost for the ISPs.
The theorem implies that ∆p being less than a threshold and
the existence of p˜ by which the payoff of ISP NoN is greater
than the payoff of this ISP when z = 0 are necessary and
sufficient conditions for zeq = 1. The reason for the former
is explained after Theorem 4. The latter follows from the fact
that, if the payoff of ISP NoN is not greater than the payoff
of this ISP when z = 0, in an NE strategy, ISP would not
choose p˜ such that zeq = 1, since the strategy of choosing an
extremely large p˜ by which z = 0 yields a better payoff.
In the following theorem, we characterize p˜ chosen by
ISP NoN by which (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F1, and also necessary
conditions for p˜ by which zeq = 1.
Theorem 4. Let p˜eq denote the optimum solution. If zeq = 1,
then p˜eq = p˜t, piNoN (pNoN , p˜t) > piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜), and
∆p < tN + κuq˜p, where piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜) is the payoff of
ISP NoN when zeq = 0.
Thus, the necessary conditions are: (i) in each region, p˜eq is
the maximum side payment by which the CP chooses zeq = 1,
i.e. the threshold defined in Definition 4, (ii) the payoff of ISP
NoN with p˜eq should be strictly larger than the payoff when
zeq = 0, and (iii) ∆p should be smaller than a threshold (if not
the number of EUs on ISP NoN would be zero, and trivially
the CP does not offer her content on this ISP).
Remark 1. Note that, if zeq = 0, then the payoff of ISP
NoN (1) is independent of p˜. Thus, piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜) is
independent of p˜.
D. Stage 1: ISPs determine peqN and p
eq
NoN :
In this section, we characterize the NE strategies peqN and
peqNoN using (1) when inertias are small, i.e. tN+tNoN ≤ κuq˜p.
The NE strategies for the case of tN + tNoN > κuq˜p are
characterized in the second part of the paper.
First, in Theorem 5, we prove that if inertias are small, then
there is no NE by which zeq = 0. Then, in Theorem 6, we
characterize the NE strategies by which zeq = 1 for the case
that the inertias are small. In Theorem 6, we prove that if the
weighted sum of inertias are smaller than a threshold, then a
unique NE exists. If not, only under certain conditions a unique
NE exists. The numerical simulations under a wide range of
parameters (presented in the second part of the paper) reveal
that these conditions are always satisfied.
By (1) and without loss of generality, in the equilibrium,
peqN ≥ c.9 In addition, if z = 0, peqNoN ≥ c. If 0 ≤ xn ≤ 1,
i.e. (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F I , from (5), the payoff of neutral and
non-neutral ISPs are as follow:
piN (pN ) = (pN − c) tNoN + κu(qN − qNoN ) + pNoN − pN
tN + tNoN
(8)
9Note that if nN > 0 then pN < c yields a negative payoff for the neutral
ISP. Thus, no pN < c can be an equilibrium payoff. If nN = 0, the value of
pN is of no importance. Therefore, without loss of generality we can consider
pN ≥ c.
8piNoN (pNoN , p˜) = (pNoN − c) tN + κu(qNoN − qN ) + pN − pNoN
tN + tNoN
+ zqNoN p˜
(9)
First, in Theorem 5, we prove that if inertias are small (tN+
tNoN ≤ κuq˜p), then there is no NE by which zeq = 0:
Theorem 5. If tN + tNoN ≤ κuq˜p, there is no NE by which
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F0, i.e. zeq = 0.
The proof is presented in Appendix C.
Next, given the strategies of the CP and EUs described in
previous sections, in the following theorem we characterize the
NE strategies by which zeq = 1 when tN + tNoN ≤ κuq˜p:
Theorem 6. If tN + tNoN ≤ κuq˜p, the NE strategies, peqN and
peqNoN by which (q
eq
N , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F1, i.e. zeq = 1, are:
1) peqNoN = c + κuq˜p − tNoN and peqN = c if and only if
q˜p ≥ tN+2tNoNκu+κad .
2) peqNoN = c +
tNoN+2tN+q˜p(κu−2κad)
3 and p
eq
N = c +
2tNoN+tN−q˜p(κu+κad)
3 if and only if q˜p <
tN+2tNoN
κu+κad
,
and piN (p
eq
N ) ≥ pdt − c where pdt = κadq˜f (tN+tNoN )peqNoN−c+κadq˜p +
peqNoN − tNoN − κuq˜p.
The theorem is proved in the Appendix C. In the following
corollary, we characterize the SPNE outcome if strategies of
Theorem 6 are SPNE.
IV. THE OUTCOME OF THE MARKET AND DISCUSSION
Now, using the equilibrium strategies characterized in the
previous section, we characterize the equilibrium outcomes of
the market in the following corollary:
Corollary 1. If tN + tNoN ≤ κuq˜p, the equilibrium outcome
of the market is:
• If tN + 2tNoN ≤ q˜p(κu + κad), then p˜eq = p˜t,1 =
κad(1− q˜fq˜p ), (q
eq
N , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ FL1 , neqN = 0, and
neqNoN = 1.• If tN + 2tNoN > q˜p(κu + κad) and conditions
of item 2 of Theorem 6 is satisfied, then p˜eq =
p˜t,2 = κad(n
eq
NoN − q˜fq˜p ), (q
eq
N , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈
F I1 , n
eq
N =
tN+2tNoN−q˜p(κu+κad)
3(tN+tNoN )
, and neqNoN =
2tN+tNoN+q˜p(κu+κad)
3(tN+tNoN )
.
Proof: First, consider Strategy 1 of Theorem 6. Item 1
of Theorem 2 yields that (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ FL1 . Thus,
neqN = 0, and n
eq
NoN = 1. In addition, by Theorem 4, p˜
eq =
p˜t,1 = κad(1− q˜fq˜p ).
Now, consider Strategy 2 of Theorem 6. Note that we
constructed this strategy such that ∆p satisfies item 3 of
Theorem 2. Thus, (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 . In addition,
by Theorem 4, p˜eq = p˜t,2 = κad(nNoN − q˜fq˜p ). Using the
expression for ∆p = peqNoN − peqN , and (5), the expressions for
neqN and n
eq
NoN follow.
Thus, results yield that when EUs have sufficiently low
inertia for ISPs, i.e. when tN + tNoN ≤ κuq˜p and tN +
2tNoN ≤ q˜p(κu+κad), the game has a unique SPNE in which
the CP offers her content with premium quality on the non-
neutral ISP while she does not offer her content on the neutral
ISP, to attract all EUs to the non-neutral ISP on which users
can receive a better quality. Thus, the neutral ISP would be
driven out of the market. This implies that upon switching to
a non-neutral regime by an ISP, the neutral ISPs are forced to
either leave the market or adopt a non-neutral regime.
Simulation results over large sets of parameters in the second
part of the paper reveal that when inertias are in the middle
range, i.e. tN+tNoN ≤ κuq˜p and tN+2tNoN > q˜p(κu+κad),
the conditions of item 2 of Theorem 6 are satisfied. Thus, in
this middle range, there exists a unique SPNE in which the
CP offers her content with premium quality on the non-neutral
ISP while she does not offer her content on the neutral ISP.
Regardless of this, the neutral ISP can fetch a positive mass
of users. Thus, both ISPS are active.
We discuss the implications of these results, the effects of
different parameters of the market (especially market powers
of ISPs) on the outcome of the market and the welfare of
end-users in the second part of this paper.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF SECTION III-B- STAGE 3
First, note that by (2), (qN , qNoN ) = (0, 0) yields a payoff
of zero, while (q˜f , q˜f ) yields a payoff of κadq˜f > 0. Thus, we
can discard strategy (qN , qNoN ) = (0, 0) from the candidate
solutions in (6). In addition, we use tie-breaking Assumption 1
to discard (0, q˜f ) ∈ FU0 , (q˜f , 0) ∈ FL0 , (q˜f , q˜f ) ∈ FU0 ∪ FL0 ,
(0, q˜p) ∈ FU0 , and (q˜f , q˜f ) ∈ FU1 ∪ FL1 . Thus, the candidate
solutions in (6) can be divided into the sub-sets characterized
in Table I as follows:
(0, q˜f ) ∈ F I0 ∪ FL0 , (q˜f , 0) ∈ F I0 ∪ FU0 , (q˜f , q˜f ) ∈ F I0 ,
(0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 ∪ FL1 , (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1
(10)
Moreover, if 0 < nNoN < 1, then the expression for the
payoff in (2), would be (using (5)):
piCP (qN , qNoN , z) =
tNoN + κu(qN − qNoN ) + pNoN − pN
tN + tNoN
κadqN
+
tN + κu(qNoN − qN ) + pN − pNoN
tN + tNoN
κadqNoN − zp˜qNoN
(11)
The following lemmas are used in proving the main results
of this section:
Lemma 1. Let (q˜f , q˜p) and (0, q˜p) belong to the set F I , i.e. for
them 0 < xN < 1. Then piG(q˜f , q˜p, z = 1) ≥ piG(0, q˜p, z = 1)
if and only if ∆p ≥ ∆pt, where ∆pt = κu(2q˜p− q˜f )− tNoN .
Proof: The proof is done by comparing the payoffs (note
that in both cases 0 < xN < 1). We use (11) to write the
expression of piG(qN , qNoN , z):
piG(q˜f , q˜p, z = 1) ≥ piG(0, q˜p, z = 1) ⇐⇒(
tNoN − κu(q˜p − q˜f ) + pNoN − pN
)
κadq˜f+(
tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) + pN − pNoN
)
κadq˜p
≥ (tN + κuq˜p + pN − pNoN)κadq˜p
⇐⇒ tNoN − κu(2q˜p − q˜f ) + pNoN − pN ≥ 0
⇐⇒ ∆p ≥ κu(2q˜p − q˜f )− tNoN = ∆pt
The result follows.
Lemma 2. Let (0, q˜p) ∈ FL1 , i.e. by which nNoN = 1. Then,
piCP (0, q˜p, z = 1) ≥ κadq˜f if and only if p˜ ≤ p˜t,1, where
p˜t,1 = κad(1− q˜fq˜p ).
Proof: We use (2) to write the expression of the payoff
of the CP:
piCP (0, q˜p, z = 1) ≥ κadq˜f ⇐⇒ κadq˜p − p˜q˜p ≥ κadq˜f
⇐⇒ p˜ ≤ κad(1− q˜f
q˜p
) = p˜t,1
Lemma 3. Let (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 , i.e. by which 0 < nNoN < 1.
Then, piCP (0, q˜p, z = 1) ≥ κadq˜f if and only if p˜ ≤ p˜t,2,
where p˜t,2 = κad(nNoN − q˜fq˜p ) and nNoN =
tN+κuq˜p−∆p
tN+tNoN
.
Proof: We compare the payoff with κadq˜f . We use (2) to
write the expression of the payoff of the CP:
piCP (0, q˜p, z = 1) ≥ κadq˜f ⇐⇒ nNoNκadq˜p − p˜q˜p ≥ κadq˜f
⇐⇒ p˜ ≤ κad(nNoN − q˜f
q˜p
) = p˜t,2
where, by (5), nNoN =
tN+κuq˜p−∆p
tN+tNoN
. The result follows.
Lemma 4. Let (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 , i.e. by which 0 < nNoN < 1.
Then, piG(q˜f , q˜p, z = 1) ≥ κadq˜f if and only if p˜ ≤ p˜t,3, where
p˜t,3 = κadnNoN (1− q˜fq˜p ) and nNoN =
tN+κu(q˜p−q˜f )−∆p
tN+tNoN
.
Proof: We compare the payoff with κadq˜f . We use (2) to
write the expression of the payoff of the CP:
piG(q˜f , q˜p, z = 1) ≥ κadq˜f ⇐⇒ (1− nNoN )κadq˜f
+ nNoNκadq˜p − p˜q˜p ≥ κadq˜f
⇐⇒ p˜ ≤ κadnNoN (1− q˜f
q˜p
) = p˜t,3
where, by (5), nNoN =
tN+κu(q˜p−q˜f )−∆p
tN+tNoN
. The result follows.
Remark 2. The values of ∆pt, p˜t,1, p˜t,2, and p˜t,3 character-
ized in the above lemmas are used in Definition 3.
We should distinguish between the solutions that maximize
(2), i.e. (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) which is not unique, and the strategy that is
10
chosen by the CP in the equilibrium, which is a unique choice
among the optimum solutions. Thus, we denote the equilibrium
strategy of the CP by (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ), which subsequently yields
the equilibrium fraction of EUs with each ISP, i.e. xeqN , N
eq
N ,
and NeqNoN .
Now, by comparing the payoffs of the candidate solutions
and using tie-breaking assumptions, we prove one of the main
results of this section, Theorem 1:
Proof: Note that an equilibrium strategy, i.e. (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ),
should be a global maxima of (2). Suppose (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ F0.
First, in Part A, we separate the cases that (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) is in
FL0 , F
I
0 , or F
U
0 , characterize the candidate optimum strategy,
i.e. (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ), chosen by the CP in each of these subsets
10,
and identify the necessary condition on ∆p for each of these
candidate optimums to be in a particular subset. In Part B,
we summarize the candidate optimum strategies. Finally, in
Part C, by comparing the payoffs of the candidate strategies in
different regions of ∆p and using the tie-breaking assumptions,
we characterize the equilibrium strategies.
Part A: First, consider F I0 . If (q∗N , q∗NoN ) ∈ F I0 , i.e. z∗ = 0,
then (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ), by (10), is (a) (0, q˜f ), or (b) (q˜f , 0), or (c)
(q˜f , q˜f ). Note that the necessary and sufficient condition for
each of these candidate outcomes to be in F I0 is
∆p−tN
κu
<
∆q∗ < ∆p+tNoNκu (Table I). First consider case (a). Note that
∆q∗ = q˜f . Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition for (a)
to be in F I0 becomes
∆p−tN
κu
< q˜f <
∆p+tNoN
κu
, which yields
κuq˜f − tNoN < ∆p < κuq˜f + tN . Similarly, For cases (b), the
necessary and sufficient condition is −κuq˜f − tNoN < ∆p <
−κuq˜f + tN , and for (c) is −tNoN < ∆p < tN .
Now, consider FL0 . If (q
∗
N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FL0 , then (q∗N , q∗NoN ),
by (10), is (d) (0, q˜f ) ∈ FL0 . Note that, using the condition in
Table I, the necessary and sufficient condition for (0, q˜f ) ∈ FL0
is ∆p ≤ κuq˜f − tNoN .
Finally, consider FU0 . If (q
∗
N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FU0 , then
(q∗N , q
∗
NoN ), by (10), is (e) (q˜f , 0) ∈ FU0 . Using the con-
dition in Table I, the necessary and sufficient condition for
(q˜f , 0) ∈ FU0 is ∆p ≥ tN − κuq˜f .
Part B: Note that, as mentioned before, the strategy that is
chosen by the CP in the equilibrium is a unique choice among
the possible optimum solutions. Thus, if (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F0,
then (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) is of the form of one of the followings (the
necessary condition for each to be optimum is also listed):
(a) (0, q˜f ) ∈ F I0 , if this is overall optimum then κuq˜f−
tNoN < ∆p < κuq˜f + tN (the necessary condition).
(b) (q˜f , 0) ∈ F I0 , the necessary condition: −κuq˜f −
tNoN < ∆p < −κuq˜f + tN .
(c) (q˜f , q˜f ) ∈ F I0 , the necessary condition: −tNoN <
∆p < tN .
(d) (0, q˜f ) ∈ FL0 , the necessary condition: ∆p ≤
κuq˜f − tNoN .
(e) (q˜f , 0) ∈ FU0 , the necessary condition: ∆p ≥−κuq˜f + tN .
Part C: Now, we compare the payoffs of the CP at each
candidate solutions, and use tie-breaking assumptions when-
ever needed to get the equilibrium strategies of the CP. The
10Note that FL0 ∪ F I0 ∪ FU0 = F0.
payoff of the CP, for each candidate solution, is as follows (by
(2)):
piCP,(a) = nNoNκadq˜f & 0 < nNoN < 1
piCP,(b) = nNκadq˜f & 0 < nN < 1
piCP,(c) = κadq˜f
piCP,(d) = κadq˜f
piCP,(e) = κadq˜f
(12)
Next, we characterize the equilibrium strategies in different
intervals of ∆p. First consider −tNoN < ∆p < tN . Note
that in this case, ∆p satisfies the necessary condition of (c)
being a candidate strategy, and also the necessary and sufficient
condition of (c) being in F I0 . In addition, piCP,(c) > piCP,(a)
and piCP,(c) > piCP,(b). Thus, (a) and (b) cannot be over-
all optimum solutions. Moreover, piCP,(c) = piCP,(d) and
piCP,(c) = piCP,(e). Using tie-breaking assumption 3 yields
that the CP prefers (c) to (d) and (e). Thus, (q˜f , q˜f ) ∈ F I0 is
chosen as the equilibrium strategy in this interval, and case 1
of the lemma follows.
Now, consider ∆p ≥ tN . Note that in this case, ∆p satisfies
the necessary condition of (e) being a candidate strategy,
and also the necessary and sufficient condition of (e) to be
in FU0 . In addition, this condition rules out (b) and (c).
However, for certain intervals of ∆p ≥ tN , the necessary
condition of candidate strategies (a) and (d) can be satisfied.
We now compare the payoff of (e) to (a) and (d). First note
that piCP,(e) > piCP,(a). Thus candidate strategy (a) can be
discarded. Also, piCP,(e) = piCP,(d). Since ∆p = pNoN−pN ≥
tN > 0,11 and by using tie-breaking assumption 5, candidate
strategy (e), i.e. (q˜f , 0) ∈ FU0 is chosen as the equilibrium
strategy in this interval by the CP. Thus, case 2 of the lemma
follows.
Finally, consider ∆p ≤ −tNoN . Note that in this case,
∆p satisfies the necessary condition of (d) to be a candidate
strategy, and also the necessary and sufficient condition of
(d) to be in FL0 . In addition, this condition rules out (a)
and (c). However, for certain intervals of ∆p ≤ −tNoN ,
the necessary condition of candidate strategies (b) and (e)
can be satisfied. We now compare the payoff of (d) to (b)
and (e). First note that piCP,(d) > piCP,(b). Thus candidate
strategy (b) can be discarded. Also, piCP,(d) = piCP,(e). Since
∆p = pNoN − pN ≤ −tNoN < 0, and by using tie-breaking
assumption 5, candidate strategy (d), i.e. (0, q˜f ) ∈ FL0 is
chosen as the equilibrium strategy in this interval by the CP.
Thus, case 3 of the lemma follows.
Note that by (12), piCP,(a) = piCP,(b) = piCP,(c) = κadq˜f
and these are all the candidate solutions.Thus, the utility of the
CP by each candidate equilibrium strategy would be κadq˜f .
The result follows.
Now, we focus on characterizing the candidate strategies and
the necessary condition for each of them when zeq = 1.
Theorem 7. If (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) ∈ F1, then (qeqN , qeqNoN ) is of the
form of one of the followings:
(a) (0, q˜p), the necessary condition: κuq˜p − tNoN <
11Note that pN and pNoN are Internet access fees.
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∆p < κuq˜p + tN . In addition, (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 if and
only if κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆p < κuq˜p + tN .
(b) (q˜f , q˜p), the necessary condition: κu(q˜p − q˜f ) −
tNoN < ∆p < κu(q˜p − q˜f ) + tN . In addition,
(q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 iff κu(q˜p − q˜f ) − tNoN < ∆p <
κu(q˜p − q˜f ) + tN .
(c) (0, q˜p), the necessary condition: ∆p ≤ κuq˜p−tNoN .
In addition, (0, q˜p) ∈ FL1 iff ∆p ≤ κuq˜p − tNoN .
Proof: Suppose (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ F1. We separate the
cases that (q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) is in F
L
1 , F
I
1 , or F
U
1 , characterize the
candidate optimum solutions chosen by the CP in each of these
subsets, and identify the necessary condition on ∆p for each of
these candidate optimum strategies to be in a particular subset.
Note that by (10), no optimum strategy is chosen in the set
FU1 . Thus, we characterize the optimum strategies chosen in
F I1 and F
L
1 by the CP.
Now, consider F I1 . By (10), if (q
∗
N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ F I1 , then
(q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) is (a) (0, q˜p) or (b) (q˜f , q˜p). The necessary
condition for each of them to be optimum is to be in F I1 . In ad-
dition, the necessary and sufficient condition for each of these
candidate outcomes to be in F I1 is
∆p−tN
κu
< ∆q∗ < ∆p+tNoNκu
(by Table I). Thus, for case (a), the necessary and sufficient
condition is κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆p < κuq˜p + tN (note that
∆q∗ = q˜p), and for case (b) is κu(q˜p − q˜f ) − tNoN < ∆p <
κu(q˜p− q˜f )+ tN . These yields candidate strategies (a) and (b)
and their conditions in the lemma.
Consider FL1 . By (10), if (q
∗
N , q
∗
NoN ) ∈ FL1 , then
(q∗N , q
∗
NoN ) is (c) (0, q˜p). Note that the necessary and sufficient
condition for (0, q˜p) ∈ FL1 is ∆p ≤ κuq˜p − tNoN (by the
condition in Table I and ∆q = q˜p). The lemma follows.
The payoff of the CP in each candidate solution of Theo-
rem 7 is as follows (using (2)):
piCP,(a) = nNoNκadq˜p − p˜q˜p & 0 < nNoN < 1
piCP,(b) = (1− n′NoN )κadq˜f + n′NoNκadq˜p − p˜q˜p & 0 < n′N < 1
piCP,(c) = κadq˜p − p˜q˜p
(13)
Thus, the payoffs are a function of p˜ and ∆p. Now, to get
the second main result of this section, we compare the payoff
of the candidate answers with the payoff of the candidate
strategies when z = 0 considering different values of p˜ and
∆p, and pick the maximum as the equilibrium strategy of the
CP. Thus Theorem 2 is proved as follows:
Proof: Now, for different regions of ∆p, we compare the
payoffs of the candidate equilibrium strategies characterized in
Theorem 7 to each other and also to the equilibrium strategies
in Theorem 1, and use tie-breaking assumptions (whenever
needed) to characterize the equilibrium strategies of the CP.
First consider ∆p ≤ κuq˜p− tNoN . In this case, ∆p satisfies
the necessary condition of candidate strategy (c) in Theorem 7.
In addition, note that by (13), piCP,(c) > piCP,(a) and piCP,(c) >
piCP,(b) (by q˜p > q˜f ). Thus, for this region, (c) is chosen if and
only if this strategy yields a higher or equal (by tie-breaking
assumption 2) payoff than the payoff when zeq = 0, that is
κuq˜f (by Theorem 1). Thus, using Lemma 2, zeq = 1, and
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ FL1 if p˜ ≤ p˜t,1. Otherwise zeq =
0, since the payoff of (c) and subsequently (a) and (b) are
smaller than the payoff when zeq = 0. Thus, in this case, the
equilibrium strategy can be found using Theorem 1. This is
item 1 of the theorem.
For ∆p ≥ tN +κuq˜p, the necessary condition of none of the
candidate strategies in Theorem 7 can be satisfied. Therefore,
zeq = 0. This is item 4 of the theorem.
Now, for the rest of the proof, we consider κuq˜p− tNoN <
∆p < tN + κuq˜p. In this case, the necessary condition
of candidate strategy (c) of Theorem 7 cannot be satisfied.
Therefore, we can eliminate (c). On the other hand, the
necessary and sufficient condition of (a) of Theorem 7 can
be met. Now, consider two different cases, q˜f ≤ tN+tNoNκu and
q˜f >
tN+tNoN
κu
:
• q˜f ≤ tN+tNoNκu . This yields that κuq˜p − tNoN ≤ tN +
κu(q˜p − q˜f ). For this case, consider two sub-cases:
◦ κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆p < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ). In
this case, ∆p satisfies the necessary and sufficient
condition of (b) in Theorem 7. Now, we should
compare piG,(a) and piG,(b). In Lemma 1, we com-
pare the payoff of the two solutions. In addition,
by tie breaking assumption 4, when the payoffs
are equal the CP chooses (b) over (a). Thus, if
∆p ≥ ∆pt, (b), i.e. (q˜f , q˜p) would be chosen
versus (a). Otherwise (a), i.e. (0, q˜p) would be
chosen. Now, we compare the payoff of the one
chosen with the payoff of the case z = 0, i.e.
κadq˜f :
If ∆p ≥ ∆pt, then by Lemma 4 and
tie-breaking assumption 2, zeq = 1 and
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 if p˜ ≤ p˜t,3 (by
comparing the payoff of strategy (b) by the
payoff when z = 0, i.e. κadq˜f ). Otherwise
zeq = 0, and the equilibrium strategy can be
found using Theorem 1. This is item 2-a-i of
the theorem.
If ∆p < ∆pt, then by Lemma 3 and
tie-breaking assumption 2, zeq = 1
and(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 if p˜ ≤ p˜t,2
(by comparing the payoff of strategy (a) by
the payoff when z = 0, i.e. κadq˜f ). Otherwise
zeq = 0, and the equilibrium strategy can be
found using Theorem 1. This is item 2-a-ii of
the theorem.
◦ tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) ≤ ∆p < tN + κuq˜p: In this
range, the necessary condition of (b) of Theo-
rem 7 cannot be satisfied. Thus, the only candidate
solution by which z = 1, whose necessary and
sufficient conditions can be satisfied, is (a) (as
stated before). Therefore, we should compare the
payoff of (a) with that of when zeq = 0, i.e. κadq˜f .
Using Lemma 3 and Assumption 2, if p˜ ≤ p˜t,2
then zeq = 1 and (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 .
Otherwise zeq = 0, and the equilibrium strategy
can be found using Theorem 1. This is item 2-b of
the theorem.
• q˜f > tN+tNoNκu : In this case, κuq˜p − tNoN > tN +
κu(q˜p− q˜f ). Thus, the necessary condition of (b) cannot
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−tNoN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) κuq˜p − tNoNtN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ) κuq˜p + tN
(q˜f , q˜p) ∈ F I1 (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1
(0, q˜p) ∈ FL1
∆p
Fig. 2. A schematic view of the ordering of different candidate equilibrium stratwgies characterized in Theorem 7 with respect to ∆p when q˜f >
tN+tNoN
κu
and z = 1.
be satisfied. Therefore, we can eliminate (c) (eliminated
before) and (b). On the other hand, the necessary and
sufficient condition of (a) of Theorem 7 can be met.
Therefore, we should compare the payoff of (a) with
that of when zeq = 0, i.e. κadq˜f . Using Lemma 3
and Assumption 2, if p˜ ≤ p˜t,2 then zeq = 1 and
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 . Otherwise zeq = 0, since
the payoff of (a) is smaller than the payoff when zeq = 0.
Thus, in this case, the equilibrium strategy can be found
using Theorem 1. This is item 3 of the theorem.
The result follows.
The following lemma simplify item 2-a of Theorem 2, and
is useful in the next stages:
Lemma 5. Consider κuq˜p− tNoN < ∆p < tN +κu(q˜p− q˜f ).
If q˜p ≥ tN+tNoNκu , then ∆p < ∆pt. If q˜p < tN+tNoNκu , then
κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆pt < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ), where ∆pt =
κu(2q˜p − q˜f )− tNoN characterized in Lemma 1.
Proof: First, consider q˜p ≥ tN+tNoNκu . Note that:
∆pt − (tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f )) = κuq˜p − tN − tNoN ≥ 0
Thus for every ∆p such that ∆p < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ), ∆pt >
∆p. This establish the first part of the lemma.
Now, consider q˜p < tN+tNoNκu . In this case:
∆pt − (tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f )) = κuq˜p − tN − tNoN < 0
and
∆pt− (κuq˜p− tNoN ) = κu(q˜p− q˜f ) > 0 (since q˜p > q˜f )
Thus, κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆pt < tN + κu(q˜p − q˜f ). The result
follows.
Theorem 2 and Lemma 5 yields the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Let q˜p ≥ tN+tNoNκu . Then the structure of the
optimum answers of the CP (results in Theorem 2) for the
case that q˜f ≤ tN+tNoNκu is the same as the results when q˜f >
tN+tNoN
κu
.
Proof: Note that items 1 and 4 of Theorem 3 are the same
for both cases, regardless of q˜f . In addition by Lemma 5, when
q˜p ≥ tN+tNoNκu , then ∆p < ∆pt. Thus, 2-a-i in Theorem 2
would not happen. Note that 2-a-ii and 2-b yields is similar
to 3. Thus, the two structures are similar, and the corollary
follows.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF SECTION III-C
First, we prove Theorem 4. Then using the results of this
theorem, we prove Theorem 3.
A. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof: It is sufficient to prove that if any one of the
conditions (1) ∆p < tN + κuq˜p, (2) p˜eq = p˜t, or (3)
piNoN (pNoN , p˜t) > piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜) is not true, then
zeq = 0. Thus, in each of the following cases, we consider
one of these conditions to be not true, and prove that zeq = 0.
• Case 1-∆p ≥ tN + κuq˜p: By Theorem 2, when ∆p ≥
tN + κuq˜p, zeq = 0. This case follows.
• Case 2-p˜eq 6= p˜t: if ∆p ≥ tN + κuq˜p, using case 1,
zeq = 0. Now, consider ∆p < tN + κuq˜p. In this case,
either p˜eq > p˜t or p˜eq < p˜t. We claim that no p˜ such
that p˜ < p˜t can be an optimum solution (the claim is
proved in the next paragraph). Thus, p˜eq > p˜t. Note that
p˜eq > p˜t yields zeq = 0 (by Theorem 2). Thus, the case
follows.
Now, we prove that no p˜ such that p˜ < p˜t can be an
optimum solution. Note that by Theorem 2, when ∆p <
tN +κuq˜p, for p˜ ≤ p˜t, the CP chooses z = 1. Thus, the
payoff of ISP NoN (7) is equal to (pNoN−c)nNoN+p˜q˜f ,
and is a strictly increasing function of p˜ (note that pNoN
is fixed and by (5), nNoN is independent of p˜). Thus,
every p˜ such that p˜ < p˜t, yields a strictly smaller payoff
for ISP NoN in comparison to the the payoff when p˜ =
p˜t. Thus, no p˜ such that p˜ < p˜t can be an optimum
solution. The result follows.
• Case 3-piNoN (pNoN , p˜t) ≤ piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜): In this
case, either p˜eq 6= p˜t or p˜eq = p˜t. Note that by Case 2,
p˜eq 6= p˜t yields zeq = 0, which yields the result.
Now, consider p˜eq = p˜t. Note that by Theorem 2, the
non-neutral ISP can ensure zeq = 0, by choosing p˜
greater than max{p˜t,1, p˜t,2, p˜t,3}. Thus, since p˜eq =
p˜t, piNoN (pNoN , p˜t) = piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜).12 By tie-
breaking assumption 6, zeq = 0. The theorem follows.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: First, note that by Theorem 4, if zeq = 1 then
piNoN (pNoN , p˜t) > piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜) and ∆p < tN+κuq˜p.
To prove the reverse, note that if piNoN (pNoN , p˜t) >
piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜) and ∆p < tN +κuq˜p, p˜ that yields zeq =
12if not, then p˜eq 6= p˜t, since p˜t is not optimum.
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0 cannot be an optimum answer. Note that by Theorem 2,
when p˜ = p˜t, the ISP NoN can make sure that zeq = 1. Thus,
in the equilibrium, zeq = 1. The result follows.
APPENDIX C
PROOFS OF SECTION III-D- STAGE 1
A. Proof of Theorem 5
Proof: We consider different regions of ∆p in Theorem 1
and Theorem 2. For each region, we prove that there is no NE.
First, consider ∆p ≤ κuq˜p− tNoN . Note that in this region,
the payoff of non-neutral ISP if zeq = 0 is at most peqNoN − c
(by (1)). On the other hand, by Theorem 2, by choosing p˜′ =
p˜t,1, ISP NoN can ensure that the CP chooses zeq = 1. In
this case, the payoff of non-neutral ISP (by (1)) is p′NoN −
c+ p˜t,1q˜NoN = p
eq
NoN − c+ κad(q˜p − q˜f ) > peqNoN − c. Thus,
piNoN (p
eq
NoN , p˜t,1) > piNoN,z=0(p
eq
NoN , p˜), and by Theorem 3,
zeq = 1. Thus, in this case, there is no NE by which zeq = 0.
Now, Consider peqN and p
eq
NoN to be NE strategies by which
zeq = 0 and ∆peq > κuq˜p − tNoN . Note that tN + tNoN ≤
κuq˜p (assumption of the theorem) yields κuq˜p − tNoN ≥ tN ,
and ∆peq > tN . Thus, by item 2 of Theorem 1, n
eq
N = 1.
Consider a unilateral deviation by neutral ISP such that p′N =
peqN +  in which  > 0 such that p
eq
NoN − p′N > κuq˜p −
tNoN . Note that the values of zeq , q
eq
N , and q
eq
NoN is the same
as before, since still ∆p′ = peqNoN − p′N > tN . Thus, again
neqN = 1, and by (1), the payoff of neutral ISP is an increasing
function of pN . Thus, p′N is a profitable unilateral deviation.
This contradicts the assumption that peqN and p
eq
NoN is NE.
Thus, the result of the theorem follows.
B. Proof of Theorem 6
Before proving the theorem, we state two lemmas with their
proof which are used in the proof of the theorem:
Lemma 6. If pNoN = c + κuq˜p − tNoN and pN = c, then
zeq = 1.
Proof: Note that in this case, ∆p = κuq˜p − tNoN . Thus,
p˜t = p˜t,1. Therefore, using Theorem 3, it is sufficient to
prove that piNoN (pNoN , p˜t,1) > piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜), where
piNoN,z=0(p˜NoN , p˜) is the payoff of ISP NoN when zeq = 0.
Note that piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜) ≤ pNoN − c = κuq˜p − tNoN
and piNoN (pNoN , p˜t,1) = κuq˜p − tNoN + κad(q˜p − q˜f ) (since
by Theorem 2, nNoN = 1, and by (1)). In addition, note that,
q˜p > q˜f . Thus, this condition holds, and the result follows.
Lemma 7. If pNoN = c+
tNoN+2tN+q˜p(κu−2κad)
3 , pN = c+
2tNoN+tN−q˜p(κu+κad)
3 , q˜p <
tN+2tNoN
κu+κad
, and κuq˜p ≥ tN +
tNoN , then zeq = 1.
Proof: Note that if κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆p < tN + κuq˜p,
by definition of p˜t (Definition 4), p˜t = p˜t,2. Thus, by
Theorem 3, it is enough to prove that piNoN (pNoN , p˜t,2) >
piNoN,z=0(p˜NoN , p˜), where piNoN,z=0(p˜NoN , p˜) is the payoff
of ISP NoN when zeq = 0.
First, we prove that piNoN (pNoN , p˜t,2) > pN − c+ κuq˜p −
tNoN + κad(q˜p − q˜f ):
piNoN (pNoN , p˜t,2) ≥ pN − c+ κuq˜p − tNoN + κad(q˜p − q˜f )
⇐⇒
(
tNoN + 2tN + q˜p(κu + κad)
)2
9(tN + tNoN )
≥ tN − tNoN + 2q˜p(κu + κad)
3
⇐⇒ (q˜p(κu + κad)− tN − 2tNoN )2 ≥ 0
In addition, note that pN−c+κuq˜p−tNoN+κad(q˜p−q˜f ) > 0,
since pN ≥ c (under the condition q˜p < tN+2tNoNκu+κad ), κuq˜p −
tNoN ≥ tN > 0 (by the assumption of the lemma), and q˜p >
q˜f . Thus, piNoN (pNoN , p˜t,2) > 0.
Now, consider piNoN,z=0(p˜NoN , p˜). Note that by the as-
sumption of the lemma κuq˜p ≥ tN + tNoN . Thus, ∆p > tN ,
and by item 2 of Theorem 1, if zeq = 0, nNoN = 0. Thus, by
(1), piNoN,z=0(p˜NoN , p˜) = 0. Therefore, piNoN (pNoN , p˜t,2) >
piNoN,z=0(p˜NoN , p˜), and the result follows.
Now, we prove Theorem 6:
Proof: We use the optimum strategies of the CP character-
ized in Theorem 2 to characterize Nash equilibria. Note that for
the case that κuq˜p ≥ tN + tNoN , by Corollary 2, the structure
of the equilibrium strategies chosen by the CP is similar to the
case that κuq˜f > tN + tNoN . Thus, in this case, items 1, 3,
and 4 of Theorem 2 characterizes the NE strategies chosen by
the CP. Thus, henceforth we assume κuq˜p ≥ tN + tNoN , and
use these items to prove the theorem.
We denote ∆p ≤ κuq˜p−tNoN by region A, κuq˜p−tNoN <
∆p < tN +κuq˜p by region B, and ∆p ≥ tN +κuq˜p by region
C. Using Theorem 2, if zeq = 1, then ∆p < tN +κuq˜p. Thus,
to characterize NE strategies by which zeq = 1, we should
characterize any possible NE strategies in regions A and B.
In Case A, we prove that the only possible NE in region A is
peqNoN = c+ κuq˜p − tNoN and peqN = c. In addition, we prove
that these strategies are NE if q˜p ≥ tN+2tNoNκu+κad . If not, then
there is no NE in region A. In Case B, we prove that the only
possible NE in region B is peqNoN = c+
tNoN+2tN+q˜p(κu−2κad)
3
and peqN = c+
2tNoN+tN−q˜p(κu+κad)
3 . In addition, we prove that
these strategies can be NE strategies if q˜p ≥ tN+2tNoNκu+κad . If not,
then there is no NE in region B.
Case A: We characterize the NE strategies peqN and p
eq
NoN
such that ∆peq = peqNoN − peqN ≤ κuq˜p − tNoN . First, in
Case A-1, we prove that if zeq = 1 the only possible NE
in this region is peqNoN = c + κuq˜p − tNoN and peqN = c,
and with these strategies, zeq is indeed equal to 1. In Case
A-2, we characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions
by which there is no unilateral profitable deviation for ISPs.
This provides the necessary and sufficient condition for these
strategies to be NE.
Case A-1: Note that by Theorem 2, for region A,
(qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ FL1 if and only if p˜ ≤ p˜t,1 =
κad(1 − q˜fq˜p ). In addition, by Theorem 4, if zeq = 1 then
p˜eq = p˜t,1 = κad(1 − q˜fq˜p ). Thus, in this region, if zeq = 1,
the payoff of ISP NoN is equal to pNoN − c + q˜pp˜t,1 (by
(1)) since nNoN = 1. Therefore, the payoff is an increasing
function of pNoN . In addition, note that in region A, nN = 0
and regardless of pN , the neutral ISP receives a payoff of zero
(by (1)). Thus, peqNoN , i.e. the equilibrium Internet access fee,
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should be such that the neutral ISP cannot get a positive payoff
by increasing or decreasing pN , and changing the region of
∆p to B or C. Using this condition, we find the equilibrium
strategy.
Note that increasing pN decreases ∆p, and cannot change
the region of ∆p. We claim that by decreasing pN to p′N
such that pNoN − p′N > κuq˜p − tNoN , the ISP N can fetch
a positive payoff as long as p′N > c (the claim is proved in
the next paragraph). Therefore, in the equilibrium, peqNoN is
such that even with p′N = c (the minimum plausible price),
∆p ≤ κuq˜p − tNoN . Thus, peqNoN ≤ c + κuq˜p − tNoN .
Given that the payoff of ISP NoN is an increasing function
of pNoN , we get p
eq
NoN = c + κuq˜p − tNoN . In addition,
we claim that peqN = c. If not, then p
eq
N > c. In this case,
∆p = peqN − peqNoN < κuq˜p − tNoN . We argued that the
payoff of ISP NoN is an increasing function of pNoN . Thus,
by increasing pNoN such that ∆p = κuq˜p − tNoN , ISP NoN
can increase her payoff, which is a contradiction with peqN and
peqNoN being NE strategies.
To prove the claim, note that if pNoN −p′N > κuq˜p− tNoN ,
then either (i) zeq = 0 or (ii) zeq = 1. Note that ∆p >
κuq˜p − tNoN ≥ tN , since q˜p ≥ tN+tNoNκu . Thus, for case
(i), (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) is of the form of part 2 of Theorem 1. Thus,
nN = 1. Therefore ISP N can fetch a positive payoff as long
as pN > c (by (1)). Now consider case (ii), i.e. zeq = 1.
Note that when pNoN − p′N > κuq˜p − tNoN , ∆p is either in
region B or C. By Theorem 2, the only deviation that yields
zeq = 1 is p′N such that ∆p in region B. Note that in this
region, by item 3 of Theorem 2, nN > 0. Thus, ISP N can fetch
a positive payoff as long as pN > c (by (1)). This completes
the proof of the claim that by decreasing pN to p′N such that
pNoN − p′N > κuq˜p − tNoN , the ISP N can fetch a positive
payoff as long as p′N > c.
Therefore, the NE strategies are peqNoN = c+ κuq˜p − tNoN
and peqN = c, and the payoff of the ISP NoN at this price by
(1) and p˜t,1 = κad(1− q˜fq˜p ) is equal to (note that nNoN = 1),
and
pieqNoN = κuq˜p− tNoN + q˜pp˜t,1 = κuq˜p− tNoN +κad(q˜p− q˜f )
(14)
which is strictly positive since q˜p ≥ tN+tNoNκu and q˜p > q˜f .
Note that Lemma 6 yields that with peqN and p
eq
NoN z
eq = 1.
Case A-2: Now, in order to prove that peqN and p
eq
NoN
are indeed NE strategies, we show that there is no unilateral
profitable deviation for ISPs. First, in Case (A-2-i) we rule out
the possibility of a unilateral profitable deviation for ISP N.
Then, in Case (A-2-ii) we rule out a possibility of a downward
unilateral profitable deviation, i.e. pNoN < p
eq
NoN , for ISP
NoN. Finally, in Case (A-3-iii), we consider a deviation of
the form pNoN > p
eq
NoN for ISP NoN, and prove that the
necessary and sufficient condition for this deviation to be not
profitable is q˜p ≥ tN+2tNoNκu+κad .
Case A-2-i: The construction of strategies peqN and p
eq
NoN
yields that there is no profitable deviation for ISP N. To prove
this formally, note that the only deviation for ISP N that might
be profitable is pN > c. With this deviation, ∆p would be still
in region A, in which nN = 0, and the payoff of ISP N is
zero. Thus, such a deviation is not profitable.
Case A-2-ii: Now, consider a deviation by ISP NoN such
that pNoN < p
eq
NoN . In this case, ∆p is in region A, and
the payoff of ISP NoN is equal to pNoN − c + q˜pp˜t,1 (by
(1) and nNoN = 1). Thus, the payoff of ISP NoN is strictly
increasing in region A. Therefore, peqNoN dominates all prices
pNoN < p
eq
NoN . Thus, this kind of deviation is not profitable
for ISP NoN.
Case A-2-iii: In this case, we consider a deviation such
that pNoN > p
eq
NoN . Thus, ∆p > κuq˜p− tNoN . Therefore, ∆p
is either in Region B or C. First, in Case A-2-iii-a we rule
out the possibility of a profitable unilateral deviation in region
C. Then, in Case A-2-iii-b, we rule out the possibility of a
profitable unilateral deviation in region B if zeq = 0. Finally,
in Case A-2-iii-c, we prove that a deviation to region B if
zeq = 1 is not profitable if and only if q˜p ≥ tN+2tNoNκu+κad .
Case A-2-iii-a: Using item 4 of Theorem 2, if ∆p in region
C, i.e. ∆p ≥ tN+κuq˜p, then zeq = 0. In this case, (qeqN , qeqNoN )
is of the form of part 2 of Theorem 1 (note that κuq˜p ≥
tN+tNoN ). Thus, nNoN = 0. Therefore, the ISP NoN receives
a payoff of zero, and a deviation of this kind in not profitable
for this ISP (since the equilibrium payoff is positive.).
Case A-2-iii-b: Consider a deviation to Region B by ISP
NoN by which zeq = 0. then by item 2 of Theorem 1, nNoN =
0. Therefore, the ISP NoN receives a payoff of zero, and a
deviation of this kind in not profitable for this ISP.
Case A-2-iii-c: Now, consider Consider a deviation to
Region B by ISP NoN by which zeq = 1. In this case, by item 3
of Theorem 2, (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 , and by Theorem 4 and Lemma 3,
p˜eq = p˜t,2 = κad(nNoN − q˜fq˜p ) and nNoN =
tN+κuq˜p−∆p
tN+tNoN
.
Therefore, using (1):
piNoN (p˜
′
NoN , p˜t,2) = (p
′
NoN − c)nNoN + κad(nNoN q˜p − q˜f )
= (p′NoN − c+ κadq˜p)nNoN − κadq˜f
(15)
in which nNoN =
tN+κuq˜p−p′NoN+c
tN+tNoN
. The maximum
piNoN (p˜
′
NoN , p˜t,2) can be found by applying the first order
condition on the payoff, which gives us:
p∗NoN = c+
1
2
(tN + q˜p(κu − κad)) (16)
This deviation is a profitable deviation in region B if (i)
piNoN (p˜
∗
NoN , p˜t,2) > pi
eq
NoN and (ii) κuq˜p − tNoN < p∗NoN −
c < tN + κuq˜p. We also claim (claim is proved in the next
two paragraphs) that if any deviation to region B is profitable,
then (i) piNoN (p˜∗NoN , p˜t,2) > pi
eq
NoN and (ii) κuq˜p − tNoN <
p∗NoN − c < tN + κuq˜p. Thus, a deviation to this region is
profitable if and only if (i) piNoN (p˜∗NoN , p˜t,2) > pi
eq
NoN and
(ii) κuq˜p − tNoN < p∗NoN − c < tN + κuq˜p.
Now, we prove the claim that (i) piNoN (p˜∗NoN , p˜t,2) > pi
eq
NoN
and (ii) κuq˜p− tNoN < p∗NoN − c < tN +κuq˜p. are necessary
condition for a profitable deviation. First, we prove that (ii) is
a necessary condition. Suppose (ii) is not true. We claim that
no p′NoN such that κuq˜p−tNoN < p′NoN−c < tN +κuq˜p can
be a profitable deviation. To prove this, note that by concavity
of (15), if p∗NoN is not such that κuq˜p − tNoN < p∗NoN −
c < tN + κuq˜p, then all p′NoN such that κuq˜p − tNoN <
p′NoN − c < tN + κuq˜p yields a strictly lower payoff than the
maximum of payoffs at the boundary points. Note that with
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the upper boundary point, ∆p = p′NoN − c = tN + κuq˜p.
In this case, by item 4 of Theorem 2, zeq = 0, and by item
2 of Theorem 1, nNoN = 0. Thus, the payoff of ISP NoN
is zero (by (1)). On the other hand, in the lower boundary
point, i.e. p′NoN = κuq˜p − tNoN + c is equal to peqNoN . Thus,
the maximum payoff at the boundary points is equal to the
equilibrium payoff. Therefore, if p∗NoN is not such that κuq˜p−
tNoN < p
∗
NoN − c < tN + κuq˜p, then all p′NoN such that
κuq˜p− tNoN < p′NoN − c < tN +κuq˜p, yields a payoff which
is strictly less than the equilibrium payoff. The proof of (ii)
being a necessary condition is complete.
Now, we prove that (i) is a necessary condition. Suppose (i)
is not true and piNoN (p˜∗NoN , p˜t,2) ≤ pieqNoN . Then, either (ii)
is true or not. If (ii) is not true, in the previous paragraph,
we prove that no p′NoN if Region B can be a profitable
deviation, which yields the result. Now, consider the case that
(ii) holds. In this case, by concavity of the payoff, p∗NoN
yields the highest payoff among pNoN ’s in Region B. Thus,
piNoN (p˜
∗
NoN , p˜t,2) ≤ pieqNoN yields that a deviation to Region
B cannot be profitable. This completes the proof of the claim.
Thus, a deviation to region B is profitable if and only if (i)
piNoN (p˜
∗
NoN , p˜t,2) > pi
eq
NoN and (ii) κuq˜p − tNoN < p∗NoN −
c < tN + κuq˜p. First we check (i) and then (ii). Using (15),
(16), and the expressions of nNoN , we find the payoff of ISP
NoN after deviation and compare it to the value of (14). We
claim that (i) is always true unless q˜p = tN+2tNoNκu+κad . Note that:
piNoN (p˜
∗
NoN , p˜t,2) ≥ pieqNoN
⇐⇒ (tN + q˜p(κad + κu))
2
4(tN + tNoN )
≥ q˜p(κu + κad)− tNoN
⇐⇒ ((κu + κad)q˜p − tN − 2tNoN)2 ≥ 0
Thus, (i) is true if and only if q˜p 6= tN+2tNoNκu+κad .
Now, we check (ii). Note that p∗NoN − c < tN +κuq˜p since:
p∗NoN − c < tN + κuq˜p ⇐⇒ q˜p(κu + κad) > −tN
is always true. Now, we should check the lowerbound, i.e.
κuq˜p − tNoN < p∗NoN − c:
κuq˜p− tNoN < p∗NoN − c ⇐⇒ q˜p(κu + κad) < tN + 2tNoN
which is true if and only if q˜p < tN+2tNoNκu+κad .
Now, using the conditions for (i) and (ii) to be true, we can
say that (i) and (ii) are true if and only if κuq˜p − tNoN <
p∗NoN − c. Thus, there is no profitable deviation to region B
if and only if q˜p ≥ tN+2tNoNκu+κad .
This completes the proof of item 1 of theorem that peqNoN =
c+ κuq˜p − tNoN and peqN = c are NE strategies if and only if
q˜p ≥ tN+2tNoNκu+κad .
Case B: Now, we characterize any possible NE strategies in
region B, i.e. κuq˜p−tNoN < ∆p < tN+κuq˜p, by which zeq =
1. First, in case B-1 we prove that if zeq = 1, the only possible
NE in this region is peqNoN = c +
tNoN+2tN+q˜p(κu−2κad)
3
and peqN = c +
2tNoN+tN−q˜p(κu+κad)
3 . We also prove that
the necessary condition for these strategies to be a NE is
q˜p <
tN+2tNoN
κu+κad
, and verify that these strategies yield zeq = 1.
In case B-2, we characterize the necessary and sufficient
condition by which these is no unilateral profitable deviation
for ISPs.
Case B-1: Note that in this region, by item 3 of Theorem 2,
if zeq = 1, then (qeqN , q
eq
NoN ) = (0, q˜p) ∈ F I1 . In addition, by
Theorem 4, p˜eq = p˜t,2 = κad(nNoN − q˜fq˜p ) and nNoN =
tN+κuq˜p−∆p
tN+tNoN
(by (5)). Thus, by (1), the payoff of ISP NoN in
this region is piNoN,B(pNoN , p˜t,2) = (pNoN−c)nNoN+p˜t,2q˜p,
and the payoff of ISP N is piN,B = (pN − c)(1−nNoN ). Note
that p˜t,2q˜p = κad(q˜pnNoN − q˜f ). Thus, using the expression
of nNoN , the payoffs are:
piNoN,B = (pNoN−c+κadq˜p)( tN + κuq˜p + pN − pNoN
tN + tNoN
)−κadq˜f
(17)
piN,B = (pN − c)( tNoN − κuq˜p + pNoN − pN
tN + tNoN
) (18)
Note that any NE inside this region should satisfy the first
order optimality condition (note that the payoffs are concave).
Thus,
dpiN
dpN
= 0⇒ tNoN − κuq˜p + pNoN − 2pN + c = 0
dpiNoN,B
dpNoN
= 0⇒ tN + q˜p(κu − κad) + pN − 2pNoN + c = 0
(19)
Solving the equation yields:
peqNoN = c+
tNoN + 2tN + q˜p(κu − 2κad)
3
(20)
peqN = c+
2tNoN + tN − q˜p(κu + κad)
3
(21)
The equilibrium payoffs for ISP are:
pieqNoN =
(
tNoN + 2tN + q˜p(κu + κad)
)2
9(tN + tNoN )
− κadq˜f (22)
pieqN =
(
2tNoN + tN − q˜p(κu + κad)
)2
9(tN + tNoN )
(23)
Now, we check the necessary conditions for these strategies
to be NE. First, note that if q˜p > 2tNoN+tNκu+κad , then p
eq
N < c,
and peqN cannot be an NE. Thus, the first necessary condition
for these strategies to be NE is q˜p ≤ 2tNoN+tNκu+κad . The next
necessary condition is that ∆peq = peqNoN−peqN to be in region
B, i.e. κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆peq < tN + κuq˜p. We claim that the
upperbound always holds. To prove this consider:
∆peq < tN + κuq˜p ⇐⇒ 2tN + tNoN + q˜p(κu + κad) > 0
which is always true. Now, we check the lower bound:
κuq˜p − tNoN < ∆peq ⇐⇒ κuq˜p − tNoN
<
1
3
(tN − tNoN + q˜p(2κu − κad))
⇐⇒ q˜p < tN + 2tNoN
κu + κad
Thus, this necessary condition together with the previous
necessary condition yields that if peqN and p
eq
NoN , NE strategies,
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then q˜p < tN+2tNoNκu+κad .
In addition, note that by Lemma 7, peqN and p
eq
NoN indeed
yields zeq = 1.
Thus, if q˜p < tN+2tNoNκu+κad , then the NE strategies can be p
eq
N
and peqNoN . To prove that these strategies are NE, we should
rule out the possibility of a unilateral profitable deviation by
both ISPs which we proceed to do in the next case.
Case B-2: In this case, we consider the possibility of a
unilateral deviation by ISPs. First, in Case B-2-i, we rule out
the possibility of a profitable deviation by the non-neutral ISP,
and then in Case B-2-ii, we provide necessary and sufficient
condition for a unilateral deviation to be not profitable for the
neural ISP.
Case B-2-i: A deviation by the non-neutral ISP can be to
regions A, C, and other prices in region B. In the following
cases, we prove that a deviation by ISP NoN to each of these
regions si not profitable:
Case B-2-i-A: Consider peqN fixed and decreasing pNoN such
that ∆p in regions A, i.e. ∆p ≤ κuq˜p − tNoN . Note that in
A the payoff of the ISP NoN is an increasing function of
pNoN (as discussed in Case A). Thus, all other prices are
dominated by p′NoN = p
eq
N + κuq˜p − tNoN . The payoff in
this case is pi′NoN = p
eq
N +κuq˜p− tNoN − c+zq˜pp˜t,1 (by (1)),
and p˜t,1 = κad(1 − q˜fq˜p ) (by definition 3). We claim that this
deviation is not profitable for ISP NoN, since:
piNoN (pNoN , p˜t,2) ≥ peqN − c+ κuq˜p − tNoN + κad(q˜p − q˜f )
⇐⇒
(
tNoN + 2tN + q˜p(κu + κad)
)2
9(tN + tNoN )
≥ tN − tNoN + 2q˜p(κu + κad)
3
⇐⇒ (q˜p(κu + κad)− tN − 2tNoN )2 ≥ 0
which is true always. Thus, no deviation is profitable for ISP
NoN.
Case B-2-i-B: Now, consider a deviation by ISP NoN inside
region B. By optimality of the solution inside B, if zeq = 1,
since pN = p
eq
N is fixed, all other pNoN such that ∆p in region
B is dominated in payoff by pNoN = p
eq
NoN . If pNoN is such
that zeq = 0, then nNoN = 0 (by item 2 of Theorem 1 and
κuq˜p− tNoN ≥ tN ). Thus, the payoff of ISP NoN is zero and
this deviation is also not profitable.
Case B-2-i-C: In this case, consider a deviation to region
C, i.e. ∆p ≥ tN + κuq˜p. Fixing peqN and increasing pNoN
such that ∆p in regions C yields a payoff of zero to ISP NoN
(since by item 4 of Theorem 2, zeq = 0 in this region, and
by Theorem 1, neqNoN = 0.). Thus, this deviation is also not
profitable.
Case B-2-ii: Now, consider a unilateral deviation by the
non-neutral ISP. Similar to the case B-2-i, this deviation can
be to regions A, C, and other prices in region B:
Case B-2-ii-A: In this case, we consider the possibility of a
deviation by ISP N to region A, i.e. ∆p ≤ κuq˜p− tNoN . Note
that in region A, piNoN (pNoN , p˜t,1) > piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜),
where piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜) is the payoff of ISP NoN when
zeq = 0. To prove this note that by q˜pp˜t,1 = κad(q˜p− q˜f ) > 0,
we can write:
piNoN (pNoN , p˜t,1) = pNoN − c+ q˜pp˜t,1
> pNoN − c > piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜)
Thus, in region A, piNoN (pNoN , p˜t,1) > piNoN,z=0(pNoN , p˜),
and by Theorem 3, zeq = 1. Thus, using Theorem 2, ib this
region nNoN = 1. Therefore, nN = 0, and by (1), the payoff of
ISP N is zero. Thus, a deviation to this region is not profitable.
Case B-2-ii-B: Now, consider a deviation inside region B
by ISP N. If zeq = 1, by optimality of the solution inside B
(since pN = p
eq
N is fixed) all other pN such that ∆p in region
B is dominated in payoff by pN = p
eq
N .
Now, consider the case that pN is such that zeq = 0. In this
case, nNoN = 0 (by item 2 of Theorem 1 and κuq˜p− tNoN ≥
tN ), and such a deviation might be profitable.
In order to have zeq = 0, by Theorem 3,
piNoN (p
eq
NoN , p˜t,2) ≤ piNoN,z=0(peqNoN , p˜), where
piNoN,z=0(p
eq
NoN , p˜) is the payoff when z
eq = 0. Note
that by the assumption of the theorem (κuq˜p ≥ tN + tNoN ),
and in this region ∆p > κuq˜p − tNoN ≥ tN . Thus, by
Theorem 1, if zeq = 0, then nNoN = 0. Therefore, by
(1), piNoN,z=0(p
eq
NoN , p˜) = 0. Using (17), we can find
piNoN (p
eq
NoN , p˜t,2), and compare the payoffs:
piNoN (p
eq
NoN , p˜t,2) ≤ piNoN,z=0(peqNoN , p˜) ⇐⇒
(peqNoN − c+ κadq˜p)(
tN + κuq˜p + p
′
N − peqNoN
tN + tNoN
)− κadq˜f ≤ 0
⇐⇒ p′N ≤ κadq˜f (tN + tNoN )
peqNoN − c+ κadq˜p
+ peqNoN − tNoN − κuq˜p = pdt
Therefore, a deviation is only profitable if p′N ≤ pdt . If
this condition holds, we need to check whether this deviation
is indeed profitable. Note that in region B, if zeq = 0, (as
explained before) by Theorem 1, nN = 1. Thus, by (1), the
payoff of ISP N is an increasing function of pN , and is equal
to p′N − c. Thus, p′N = pdt yields the maximum payoff after
deviation. Therefore, such a deviation is not profitable if and
only if pdt − c ≤ piN (peqN ).
Case B-2-ii-C: Now, consider a deviation by ISP N to region
C, i.e. ∆p ≥ κuq˜p+tN . Note that in region C, zeq = 0, and by
item 2 of Theorem 1, nN = 1. Thus, the payoff of ISP N (1) is
an increasing function of pN . Thus, p′N = p
eq
NoN − κuq˜p− tN
(by definition of region C) yields the highest payoff after devi-
ation. Note that by (20), peqNoN = c+
tNoN+2tN+q˜p(κu−2κad)
3 .
Therefore, p′N = c +
tNoN−tN−2q˜p(κu+κad)
3 . In addition, note
that by the assumption of the theorem, κuq˜p ≥ tN + tNoN .
Thus, p′N < c, and by (1), the payoff of neutral ISP is negative.
Thus, this deviation is not profitable.
Therefore, we only need to check the condition in Case B-
2-ii-B for ruling out profitable deviations. This is item 2 of the
theorem. The theorem follows.
